Article 10
of the Basic Law (or Grundgesetz, the German Constitution) states:
"(1) Privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications shall be
inviolable. (2) Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a statute. Where a
restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence
or security of the Federation, the statute may stipulate that the person
affected shall not be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the
courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies
appointed by Parliament." Attempts to amend the Basic Law to include a
right to data protection were discussed after reunification, when the
Constitution was revised, and were successfully opposed by the then-conservative
political majority.
In a 1983
case against a government census law, the Federal Constitutional Court formally
acknowledged an individual's "right of informational
self-determination" which is limited by the "predominant public
interest." The central part of the verdict stated, "Who can not
certainly overlook which information related to him or her is known to certain
segments of his social environment, and who is not able to assess to a certain
degree the knowledge of his potential communication partners, can be
essentially hindered in his capability to plan and to decide. The right of
informational self-determination stands against a societal order and its
underlying legal order in which citizens could not know any longer who what and
when in what situations knows about them." This landmark court decision derived the
"right of informational self-determination" directly from Articles 1
(1) and 2 (1) of the Basic Law, which declare personal rights (Persönlichkeitsrecht) to freedom are
inviolable.
Germany has
one of the strictest data protection laws in the European Union. The world's
first data protection law was passed in the German Land of Hessen in 1970. In
1977, a Federal Data Protection Law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
or BDSG) followed, which was reviewed in 1990, amended in 1994 and 1997. The final revision took place in 2002
to be in line with the EU Data Protection Directive. The general purpose of this law is "to
protect the individual against violations of his personal rights by handling person-related
data." The law covers collection, processing and use of personal data
collected by public federal and state authorities (as long as there is no state
regulation), and by non-public offices, if they process and use data for
commercial or professional aims.
The 2001
revisions to the BDSG include regulations on transmitting personal data abroad,
video surveillance, anonymization and pseudonymization, smart cards, and
sensitive data collection (relating to race/ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical convictions, union membership, health, and sexual
orientation). It grants data subjects greater rights of objection. It also
states that companies must now appoint a data protection officer if they
collect, process, or use personal information; that databases collecting such
information must be registered with German data protection authorities (DPAs);
and that consent from the individual whose data is collected is required after
full disclosure of data collection and its consequences. According to the
Federal Data Protection Commissioner (BfD), secondary legislation will need to
be introduced on the auditing requirements and a more general revision of
German data protection law may be outlined by the end of 2005. According to the Conference of German DPAs, the
main challenges will be to introduce "opt in" instead of "opt
out" solutions for marketing; improve the ability to use the Internet
anonymously, and ensure consent to use personal data.
The Federal
Data Protection Commission (Bundesbeauftragter
für den Datenschutz, or BfD) is an independent federal agency that
supervises the Federal Data Protection Act. Its chief duties include receiving and
investigating complaints, as well as submitting recommendations to parliament
and other governmental bodies. The BfD publishes a bi-annual activity report. In 2003 there were between 10,000 and 20,000
data controllers registered by the agency. However, the number of controllers is steadily
decreasing as federal agencies, in compliance with the 2001 changes to the Act,
appoint in-house data protection officers, as an alternative to registration
under the Act. The BfD, which has 70 people on staff, handles
about 4,500 written and oral complaints and carries out approximately 45 investigations
each year.
All of the
sixteen Länder have their own
specific data protection regulations that cover the public sector of the Länder administrations. All Länder have adopted new data protection
laws pursuant to the EU Data Protection Directive. Each Land
also has a data protection commissioner to enforce the Länder data protection
acts and supervise the private sector.
Another
important federal law in Germany is the G-10 law, which imposes limitations on
the secrecy of certain communications. The G-10 law was amended in 2001 to
require that service providers give law enforcement the means to monitor data
as well as voice lines. Officials are trying to convince Internet
Service Providers to self-regulate content, and European ISPs and data protection
commissioners continue to resist demands from police agencies to allow expanded
surveillance of e-mail and store related data. These demands proposed by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs are similar to the ENFOPOL 38 proposals at the EU
level.
In May 2002
the European Parliament voted to adopt a series of amendments that modifed
current telecommunications privacy law and took effect in October 2003. These amendments do not impose limitations on
how long EU member governments can retain personal information for use in
criminal investigations, and require ISPs to lengthen the time they store
information regarding subscribers' online and phone activity. The Federal Constitutional Court has set out
strict limitations for the retention of personal data for purposes other than
the original ones (for official requirements or the conclusion of a contract).
For these reasons, Germany has been very reluctant to accept new European laws
providing for the retention of data for a period of up to two years. Nevertheless, there are many proposals
published by the European Community and the Bundserat
(second chamber of the federal legislature representing the Länder governments) requiring not only
ISPs, but all telecommunications and multimedia service providers to
systematically retain all data without any suspicion for at least six months. A
recent questionnaire circulated by the EU working party on cooperation in
criminal matters indicates a proposal to mandate retention of such data for law
enforcement purposes for a period of 12-36 months. This proposal and others
continue to be strongly opposed by the German data protection authorities
because of the implications for the hindrance of freedom of speech, access to
information, and privacy of communications, and were left out altogether when adopting the
new Telecommunication Law (TKG).
In October
2001, the German government passed a law requiring fixed and wireless
telecommunication companies to install, at least until January 2005, technology
that gives police and security agencies access to most German communications.
ISPs are not affected by this law.
Wiretapping
is also regulated by the G-10 law and requires a court order for criminal
cases. In July 1999, the Constitutional Court issued a
decision on a 1994 law which authorizes warrantless automated wiretaps
(screening method) of international communications by the Intelligence Service
(BND) for purposes of preventing terrorism and illegal trade in drugs and
weapons. It was reported in 1999 that the BND had 1,400
operatives listening in on satellite communications. The Constitutional Court ruled in December 1999
that the government could conduct surveillance of political parties if it is
believed that they are hostile to the Constitution and information cannot be
obtained by public means. Also, telephone monitoring has been on the
increase since 1995, when there were 4,674 instances of monitoring, up to
21,874 in 2002. Four out of five wiretappings monitor
cell-phones. This renewed rise of interventions in secret communications gives
the federal commissioners great concern for data security. For years, the
commissioners have appealed to prosecution authorities to use this means
sparingly.
Recently,
the so called "Grosser Lauschangriff"
(Big Eavesdropping Attack), a law that contained a set of various additional
authorizations for police to survey potential criminals, was challenged before
the Federal Constitutional Court. After a fiercely fought six-year political
debate, a two-thirds majority of the German Parliament eventually approved a
change to Section 13 of the Constitution in April 1998, making it legal for
police authorities to place bugging devices even in private homes (provided
there is a court order). This change was the provision for the Law for the
Enhancement of the Fight Against Organized Crime, which became effective in
1999. In March 2004, the
German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that significant portions of the 1998 Grosser Lauschangriff wiretapping laws infringed upon the guarantees of human dignity and
the inviolability of the home under Articles 1 and 13 of the constitution, or
Basic Law. The court held that certain
communications are protected by an absolute area of intimacy where citizens can
communicate privately without fear of government surveillance. This includes conversations with close family members, priests,
doctors and defense attorneys, but excludes conversations about crimes that
have already been committed or the planning of future crimes. However, to justify surveillance between the
target and such persons of trust, the government must show "there is
strong reason to believe that the content of conversation does not fall in the
area of intimacy," and that the crime is "particularly serious". Once a specially protected conversation begins the eavesdropping
must stop immediately and any recordings of that portion of the conversation
must be erased. The German legislature
has until June 2005 to amend Grosser
Lauschangriff to comply with the court's decision.
In 2001, the
Bundestag (the German Parliament)
passed a new law providing access for police and law enforcement to
"telecommunication connection data" for the investigation of serious
crimes (in addition to, and independently of, wiretapping the contents of a
telephone conversation). The law took effect in January 2002 and requires
telecommunications service providers to disclose data, such as time and
duration of use, place of use and identifying numbers. However, the law contains a sunset clause of
five years and requires further evaluation before its extension. According to a recent survey, 75 percent of
conducted telephone wiretapping actions violated the law. In most instances of
wiretapping, law enforcement agencies did not inform the subjects after the
eavesdropping took place, contrary to what is stipulated by the law. Therefore, the data protection authorities have
urged the federal government to conduct independent scientific evaluations to
control the expansion of wiretapping, to cut it down where necessary, and to
strengthen judicial oversight of its use.
In April
1998, a law was passed that allows the Bundeskriminalamt
(Federal Police) to run a nationwide database of genetic profiles related to
criminal investigations and convicted offenders. One month later, the Bundesgrenzschutz (Border Protection
Forces), originally a para-military border police force, now responsible for
guarding railways and stations, received permission to check persons'
identities and baggage without any concrete suspicion.
Wherever
they deal with the handling of personal information on natural persons, either
directly or by amendments, nearly all German laws contain references to the
respective data protection law or carry special sections on the handling of
personal data that reflect the right to privacy. Most recently there have been
several laws relating to communications privacy. The new Telecommunications Act
of 2004 contains a whole chapter on data protection, incorporating provisions
of an earlier Telecommunications Data Protection Ordinance.
The
Information and Communication Services (Multimedia) Act of 1997 sets
protections for information used in computer networks. Despite these statutory protections, a
September 2001 poll revealed that two of every five German PC owners over the
age of fourteen do not use the Internet because of data security concerns. The Act also sets out the legal requirements
for digital signatures, which were made legally binding by legislation passed
in 2001 to conform to the EU Directive on a Community framework for electronic
signatures (1999/93/EC). In January 2002, the German government
announced plans to provide, within three years, more than 200,000 federal
employees with the ability to sign electronic documents with chip cards
containing encrypted keys. Such signatures would hold the same legal weight as
handwritten signatures on paper documents.
Additionally,
there are some privacy issues addressed by laws covering other areas. For
example, it is an offense under Section 1 of the German Unfair Competition Act
to send unsolicited commercial communications (spam) in Germany. This
effectively means that sending direct marketing e-mail without the consumer's
consent is illegal under German law, as the e-mail would be regarded as
unsolicited. Despite these legal protections, a June 2002
study conducted by the German Electronic Commerce Forum revealed that spam is
considered a significant problem by German consumers.
In 1996, the
Berlin Data Protection Commissioner reached an agreement with German Railway
and a US bank (Citibank), which were planning to issue combined Railway and
Visa cards. As all the processing of information would have taken place in the
United States, the Berlin Data Protection Commissioner invoked the EU Data
Protection Directive's prohibition on transborder dataflows to stop the deal.
The transaction was allowed to go through once German Railway and Citibank
signed a contract guaranteeing German citizens the same protection for their
personal information in the US as they enjoyed in Germany. The agreement (later terminated for economic
reasons) was an important precursor for transborder dataflows to the US and
other countries without privacy laws.
In May 2002,
Germany's Minister of Health, Data Protection Commissioner, and healthcare
organizations announced plans for the development of an electronic universal
healthcare card. The proposed card will contain, among other data, a patient's
identification and emergency healthcare information. Patients will be able to
use the card to fill prescriptions and disclose healthcare information to
physicians on a voluntary basis. The card will likely be implemented in 2006.
In June
2001, the German Ministry of the Economy and Labor presented a software
prototype that would let consumers make anonymous Internet purchases and
payments. The software was scheduled for general availability for testing in
2002. This is part of a project called Data Protection in Teleservices, the
goal of which is to develop software that can accommodate data privacy law
requirements. The Ministry of the Economy and Labor announced that seventy-nine
percent of online shops fail to adequately inform customers about their data
privacy rights, and that eighty-four percent of Germans have privacy concerns
about surfing the web. The program meets the quality criteria for Internet data
privacy protection and the Teleservices Data Privacy Law.
There is
currently no general Freedom of Information (FOI) act in Germany. On September
26, 2001, the Federal Government presented the design for a FOI law, Informationsfreiheitsgesetz. (IFG)The
law, which was supposed to be modeled after the US Freedom of Information Act,
would have allowed citizens to request access to basically all information on
federal authorities. In 2002, however, the proposed law was dropped by its
sponsors. The IFG is supposed to be reintroduced through
2006. Some Länder
already have their own FOI laws in effect. The Land of Brandenburg adopted a
FOI law in 1998 to allow citizen access to government records. The Information and Data Protection
Commissioner enforces the act. More recently, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, and
Nordrhein-Westfalen have also adopted FOI laws.
Since 1990,
a law has allowed access to the files of the Stasi (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit),
the security service of former East Germany, for individuals and researchers.
The law created a Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security
Services of the former German Democratic Republic (formerly the Gauck
Authority, named after its first Commissioner), which has a staff of 3,000 piecing together shredded documents and
making files available. There have been 1.6 million requests from
individuals for access to the files and 2.7 million requests for background
checks since the archives became available. Many of the files were destroyed in 1989, but
in 1990, the US Central Intelligence Agency was able to obtain the names,
aliases and payment histories of 4,000 spies who worked in various countries
for the Stasi or informers from the
Soviet Union. The US Government refused to give the files to the German
government until December 1999, claiming that it would harm the people in the
files. In May 2000, files about former Chancellor
Helmut Kohl's telephone calls were found to be missing from the archives when
they were going to be used to investigate corruption. The Stasi had conducted extensive wiretapping of Kohl for years. In late 2000, Kohl's lawyers launched legal
action to prevent the publication of transcripts of his telephone conversations
recorded by the Stasi. The government
wanted to release those it believes are of historical interest, but Kohl's
lawyers argued that the information was gathered illegally. In July 2001, the Federal Administrative Court
ruled that information collected by the Stasi
about Kohl could not be disclosed to researchers or the media without Kohl's
express consent. Subsequently, the German Parliament amended the Stasi Files
Act to allow Kohl's files to become accessible by the media, at least to some
extent. The amendment, which came into force in
September, 2002, allows Stasi files
to be disclosed to journalists and researchers, even where the subject is a
victim of surveillance, if the information requested is linked with the
political function or office of the person in question. Kohl again brought suit, this time claiming
that this amendment is unconstitutional. A lower Adminstrative court in Berlin
dismissed their claim in September 2003. The case was appealed directly to the
Federal Adminstrative Court. On June 23, 2004, this court upheld most of its
original 2001 judgment, interpreting the amendment to the Stasi Files Act
restrictively, with the effect that large parts of the files concerning the
former chancellor will not be disclosed to the media. The court took the view
that the Stasi violated the
principles of the rule of law when spying on people, and that victims of such
practices should therefore have control over whether this information is given
to the media. However, researchers will still be allowed to access Stasi files with personal data if
further disclosures to the public would be effectively prohibited.
Germany
enacted several provisions intended to deter terrorist activity after the
September 2001 attacks in the US. The Counterterrorism Act, which took effect
in January 2002, comprehensively changed several existing laws. Among the most
prominent revisions are those that create legal bases for biometric
identification in passports and identity cards; make it easier for authorities
to share information; allow the BND to request user information from ISPs,
airlines, and travel agencies; and create a speech framework database to make
possible speech recognition of asylum seekers. In February 2002, the Interior Ministry
announced that its counterterrorist efforts would include encrypted biometric
identification cards for all citizens, as well as fingerprinting and face
recognition technologies. However, biometric identification cards have
not yet been introduced. The Federal Ministry is searching for a common
approach at the EU level. The data protection authorities (DPAs) do not oppose
their use in general. Nevertheless the DPAs stress that the following criteria
will be met: 1. the Ministry must ensure that biometric data will not be used
to gain other information about additional personal attributes; 2. persons must
know which biometric data of them will be stored and used; 3. biometric data
should be used only for the purpose of identification; 4. quick mechanisms to
secure accuracy must be developed in order to prevent any discrimination.
Citizens
have challenged several the tactics used by German law enforcement to uncover
terrorist suspects. By February 2002, courts in Berlin and Frankfurt had upheld
objections to the use of "computerized searches of government
records" (or Rasterfahndung) to profile terrorist suspects based
partly on religious identification. Other courts thought the search was legal.
However, the Federal DPA points out that all data of persons not related to
terrorist activities have to be deleted immediately and new evaluations have to
be carried out to test its efficiency. Despite concerns raised by the public and the
obvious inefficiency of the Rasterfahndung
initiated after September 11, Germany submitted in April 2002 to the EU a
proposal to make it possible to conduct investigations using this surveillance
tool (Rasterfahndung) throughout the
Union to help combat terrorism.
In 2002,
Germany decided to install a new system to electronically collect tolls for
trucks using the national highways. The system tracks vehicles through GPS
(Global Positioning System) and cellular phone networks. According to a common
standpoint of the DPAs in 2001, the Federal government implemented special data
protection measures in the laws governing toll systems: data collection and
processing is limited only for the purpose of billing; all data must be deleted
after the payment; and all data collected from vehicles that are not subject to
a toll must be immediately deleted. German authorities have also recently proposed
implementation of a video surveillance system at toll collection points, to
ensure that trucks from other countries are paying the proper tolls on the
autobahn. Video footage would be compared against a
central database. Privacy and data security groups have protested this
proposal, citing the possibility for using the data for purposes other than
toll-collection. Indeed, although this surveillance data is only supposed to be
used for toll-collection and enforcement purposes, the German police recently
gained access to the data when trying to locate a stolen garbage truck.
There are
been several other video surveillance projects in Germany which have generated
a response from privacy and data protection advocacy groups. For example, a
private group called Der Grosse Bruder (Big Brother) has created a map of Munich, highlighting all
the video surveillance cameras installed there. In 2003, the Humanistische Union (Humanistic
Union) sued a Berlin shopping center employing a video
surveillance system with a range of vision which included a public street. In Weimar, Germany, a local newspaper protested
the installation of video surveillance cameras which watched the entrance of a
newspaper building (along with medical and political offices), and the local
government eventually uninstalled the cameras.
Germany also
implemented in the Criminal Code (StPO) the possibility of using a so-called
IMSI-Catcher system to track individuals trough the location of their cell
phones. The bill, which entered into force on August 14, 2002, provides for law
enforcement the ability to obtain, upon court request and from the time their
request is granted, the data of individuals' movements and their cell phone
device number (IMEI number) for a period of up to 6 months.
The revision
of the credit sector of the economy imposes rules for banks to disclose client
data to the Federal Institution for the Supervision of the Credit Economy
(FISCE). The FISCE will store data about all owners of
bank accounts or depots and is required to transfer them to other public
agencies upon request. Banks also have to run special surveillance programs to
detect suspicious money transfers. In a recent statement, the data protection
commissioners urged banks to inform their clients in writing and obtain a
written consent.
The DPAs
also stress that new opportunities to test human genetic code (DNA) for
different purposes must be regulated in order to prevent misuse of genetic
data. The commissioners point out that no one should be forced to take any
genetic tests. They also require that the use of data gained through genetic
tests not legally approved and without explicit consent of the concerned person
should be criminalized.
In May 2003
the German retail giant Metro started a trial project to introduce a new
cashing and customer convenience program with small chips, called Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, at their Metro Future Store. The chips
will be attached to all products. When queried by a radio device, RFID chips
respond by transmitting a unique ID code. It therefore allows customers to pay
and checkout automatically by pushing a loaded trolley past a sensor. Combined
with an automatically readable customer client card, the system would allow the
tracking of all purchases and the linking to the customer's identity. Metro claimed that the RFID chips could easily
be deactivated, thus erasing any privacy invasions, but their process for
deactivation leaves intact the unique identifying number on the RFID chip, so
even "deactivated" cards can be traced back to their origin. In March, 2004, Metro halted the trial program
in response to protests from digital rights groups regarding possible privacy
violations. Outcry was particularly forceful upon discovery
that Metro had placed RFID devices in their "Extra Future Card"
(personal customer shopping card) without notifying consumers. This use of RFID was uncovered by a German NGO
called FoeBuD by taking x-ray photos of the card. FoeBuD also staged two protests, one in front
of the Metro Future Store and one at a "pro-RFID" conference, and has
recently been granted money by the Bewegungsstiftung (a German group which supports and promotes
social movements and reform projects) to develop the "privatizer," a
small device which consumers could use to find hidden and embedded RFID chips
in consumer products. In a recent speech, the Federal Data Protection
Commissioner pointed out the privacy implications of RFID, and called on the
legislature to make provisions on RFID tags.
There is a
recent proposal to introduce an obligatory "smart jobcard" for all
employees in Germany. The proposal is motivated by the reduction of
employers' costs of certification in social security matters. Data such as
current employer, salary and working hours would be stored in a centralized
database, which all social security entities could access on request, with
consent of the owner of the job card. However, the Länder data protection commissioners claim that this project
constitutes a systematic data collection without a specific purpose, and
therefore violates the right of self-determination as enumerated by the
Constitutional Court. The commissioners also feared that the use of the social
security number (Rentenversicherungsnummer)
as a personal identification number would create serious privacy implications.
At a conference on April 25, 2004, the data protection commissioner for
Schleswig Holstein proposed some standards for the jobcard, such as a right of
access to stored information by the employee, encryption of the data using a
public key, and restricted access to the database.
In a May
3-4, 2004 speech, the Federal Data Protection Commissioner Peter Schaar called
for a new reform of German privacy laws. He referred to a widely-read study which proposed huge legislative reforms in
order to reduce the number of laws governing specific details of privacy
protection. The study proposes to create one general statute, which refers only
when necessary to more detailed regulations. An ideal statute would provide general rules
about the use of privacy-friendly techniques, data security, privacy standards,
control of data processing, and self-regulation tools. Peter Schaar also cites a need for a new data
protection statute regarding the use of employees' personal data in the context
of controlling web-surfing behavior and the protection of the employers'
computer systems against viruses and spam.
Germany is a member of the
Council of Europe and has signed and ratified the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention
No. 108) and later signed an Additional Protocol to this convention. It has also signed and ratified the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention No. 005). In November 2002 Germany signed the Convention on Cybercrime but
has not yet ratified it. It is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and has adopted the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.