Terrorism Profile - Uganda

19/12/2004

Uganda

The definition of terrorism in Uganda is contained in the Anti Terrorism Act 2002, which was passed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the US. The Act defines terrorism as “the use of violence or threat of violence with intent to promote or achieve religious, economic and cultural or social ends in an unlawful manner, and includes the use, or threat to use, violence to put the public in fear or alarm”.

 From late 1997 to 1999 Uganda experienced a wave of terrorism characterised by bomb throwings in pubs, taxi parks, markets and other public places. The bombs, which government blamed on a dissident group with bases in Congo known as the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), killed over 50 people and injured over 160. Security agencies, which were apparently caught by surprise by the bomb attacks, responded by incarcerating persons suspected of terrorism in illegal detention places known as ‘safe houses’[1]. The other group which Uganda labels a terrorist organisation is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has waged a brutal campaign against government in northern Uganda since 1988.  The LRA, which claims it wants to rule the country along the Biblical Ten Commandments, has mainly targeted civilians. Following the September 11 2001 attacks in the US, the American government placed both the LRA and the ADF on its list of terrorist organisations.

The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002

The government-appointed Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), civil society agencies and some international organisations condemned the use of ‘safe houses’ amidst reports that suspects were held there for longer than the statutory period of 48 hours within which they were supposed to be charged. In addition there were rampant reports of torture of suspects in these ungazzetted detention centres.[2] The UHRC advised government to enact a law to control and eliminate terrorism. The September 11 events then galvanized the move towards adopting an anti-terrorism law.

The act has drawn severe condemnation, for one because the scope of what can be dubbed terrorism is large and ambiguous. Critics say the act has had the effect of forcing the media into self-censorship, while civil society groups have also had to tread more careful lest they fall foul with the law. Livingstone Ssewannyana, the Executive Director of the local NGO Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), says the Act contains several provisions that are “in conflict with international standards particularly the freedom of expression and Association. “An objective examination of the act from a human rights perspective shows that it potentially infringes on freedom of expression and assembly, including media freedom,” he says.[3]

 The Act says anyone who engages in or carries out any act of terrorism commits an offense and shall on conviction be liable to suffer death. Any person who establishes, runs or supports any institution for promoting terrorism, publishing and disseminating news or materials that promote terrorism is also liable to suffer death upon conviction. The law gives the Minister for Internal Affairs power to dissolve any terrorist organisation, provide for its winding up, and for the forfeiture to the state of that organization’s assets. He does these through a statutory instrument made with the approval of cabinet. The instrument has to be laid before parliament within 14 days after being published in the Government Gazette and may be annulled by parliament by resolution within 21 days after being laid.

 Security officers are empowered by the law to intercept the communications of a person and to keep such persons under surveillance. The Act says, “An authorised officer shall have the right to intercept the communication of a person…” The Internal Affairs Ministers by writing designates a security officer as an authorised officer. The scope of the interception and surveillance specified by the law include interception of letters and postal packages of any person; interception of telephone calls, faxes, emails and other communications made or issued by or addressed to a person; and monitoring meetings of any group of persons. Others are surveillance of the movements and activities of any person; electronic surveillance of any person; access to bank accounts of any person; and searching of the premises of any person.

 The Act says that the purposes for which interception or surveillance may be conducted are safeguarding the public interest; prevention of the violation of the fundamental and other human rights and freedoms of any person from terrorism; prevention or detecting the commission of any offence; and safeguarding the national economy from terrorism. The law says a magistrate may, on an application made by an investigating officer, issue a warrant for searching material which the Act categorises as ‘excluded or special procedure material’.

 While giving security officers leeway to use ‘reasonable force’ while pursuing terrorism suspects, the Act says no police officer or person assisting such an officer is liable to any civil proceedings for anything they do while hunting suspected terrorists.

 David Ouma Balikowa, an editor at the independent daily newspaper, The Monitor, says besides the death sentence endangering the journalism profession, “the law – in a fluid political context characterized by unending civil strife – is bound to be abused by the often-errant government officials”. He adds:

The state or individuals within the state can use this law to victimise the media for publishing news or any other material about rebel activities. This law can also be used to censor news about rebel activities and deny the public truthful information on how the government’s counter-insurgency operations are progressing in the country. This fear is exacerbated by the fact that the truth is often the first casualty in a situation of war. Government, as our unending wars have demonstrated, is often at pains to try to underplay the magnitude of rebellion even when human casualty figures are increasing. The state often plays hide and seek when the media and public demand to know more about the war with rebels.[4]

 Balikowa, a former president of the East African Media Institute, says publishing news about terrorist activities is not synonymous with supporting terrorism, and should therefore not be criminalised as the law seeks to do.

 Though there was an attempt to place the powers to ban a terrorist organisation with Parliament, government successfully fought this. Former Internal Affairs Minister Eriya Kategaya reasoned then, that “We need to have this power to move quickly and decisively against suspected terrorists before they cause more havoc.” The Chairman of the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs committee, Adolf Mwesige, while presenting his committee report objected to giving minister powers to declare which organisation is terrorist. "This exercise is so important that it would require parliamentary approval," Mwesige said. But the Internal Affairs Minister argued that by seeking Parliament's approval before making the declaration, vital intelligence information would be revealed. He said this would compromise the security of the country and the whole purpose of the law would be lost.

 But civil society doubts that it is only terrorists that government is targeting. The FHRI says the Act may be used to suppress individuals and organisations that dare to criticise the government. It adds:

Indeed the provision concerning the dissemination of information or promotion of terrorism is defined so widely that when coupled with the power to ban organisations, it gives the government extensive powers to suppress both its political opponents and the media… this is subject to abuse and [can] lead to the restriction of media organizations that would provide an alternative voice. Further, [multi-party] political activity has been banned in Uganda since 1986 and there is a worry that the Act will be used to ensure that political debate continues to be stifled.[5]

 Critics of the Act say that the law makes it an offense to publish a story on a party, church, NGO, or individual whom the government has labelled terrorists.

 Attacks On The Media

The Uganda government has increasingly used the penal code to rein in what it considers “errant journalists”. Section 39 (a) which prohibits publication of information prejudicial to national security; and section 50 that prohibits publication of “false news likely to cause alarm or disturb the public peace” have been used regularly. Adolf Mbaine, a communication lecturer at Makerere University in the capital Kampala, says: “The point has been made before that media freedoms have implications for the general freedoms of expression; and that when media freedoms suffer, the other will most likely follow in the same order.” He adds that one area in which the Museveni regime is similar to the past regimes is the arrest and arraignment of journalists before courts of law for publication offences. Mbaine says this has very serious consequences for freedom of expression and of the press, and that interestingly, government thinks it is democratic to behave in this manner.[6]

 Largely because of the war in the north that started in 1986, government found it necessary to institute and use section 39A that prohibits publication of information regarding military operations, strategies, troop movement, location of military equipment of the armed forces or of the enemy if this publication is likely to endanger the safety of equipment or supplies or the safety of the armed forces of Uganda; or assist the enemy or corrupt public order and security.

 Government has been using both judicial and extra-judicial means to bar the press from publishing certain information. This year, for instance, it has had court stop the media from publishing a report on investigations into corruption in the army; and another on the Constitutional Review Commission. The ransacking of the independent The Monitor newspaper in October 2002, which saw security operatives occupy its premises for a week, confiscate diskettes, documents and a server, was another case to indicate the tough stance President Museveni’s regime has lately adopted towards the media. The army said it took the drastic action because the paper had written a false report about the war on terrorism. It reported that an army chopper had crashed in the northern Uganda war zone. Government subsequently took The Monitor to court but lost the case.

 Analysts say the suits government has regularly brought against the critical press have hardly been successful and the charges are normally used to put pressure on the press, but that this in itself is oppressive because of the long periods spent attending court.[7] Commenting on the state’s suppression of the media, one observer wrote:

"Most recently the government has itself resorted to the courts to impose curbs on publication of material it considers prejudicial. Clearly this is much more preferable to arbitrary arrests and cloaks the government’s interventions with judicial approval. When on 5 February 2004 the paper published an article about an ongoing inquiry into corruption in the army the government obtained an injunction from the High Court in Kampala preventing The Monitor from publishing any further information on the ongoing probe. It successfully argued that the details of the inquiry were a highly sensitive and classified nature. Earlier in December 2003 the government had also successfully applied to court to stop the same paper from publishing leaked reports of the Constitutional review Commission’s recommendations on proposed constitutional amendment provisions."[8]

Early in 2004, the army announced that it was investigating some journalists for links to LRA rebels. Army spokesman Major Shaban Bantariza said the investigations begun when the army recovered the telephone contacts of the journalists from the body of an LRA commander, who was killed by the government army in northern Uganda. He added that those mentioned should defend themselves because they were “dealing with terrorists”. This announcement drew condemnation from around the world. The International Federation of Journalists General Secretary Aidan White said, “The wild allegations against some of the most prominent journalists in the country are outrageous, especially because the anti-terrorism act still carries the death penalty for any act of terrorism. They are blatant efforts to systematically stifle voices of dissent and undermine journalists’ rights to report in Uganda”. [9]

Stephen Ouma, General Secretary of the Uganda Journalists Union, said the biggest problem journalists faced was that this threat to their impartiality and efforts to report independently and use different sources of information could jeopardize their position. He said government would now and then charge journalists who talked to dissidents, opposition politicians or people with divergent views.[10] Andrew Mwenda, an investigative journalist at The Monitor says he has written some stories which his paper did not publish for fear of retribution from the state.[11]

Uganda was the only country in Africa where a journalist was killed in 2002. Jimmy Higenyi, a student at the private journalism school United Media Consultants and Trainers, was shot by police while covering a rally of the opposition party Uganda People’s Congress in Kampala on 12 January. The government had banned the gathering, and police officers trying to disperse the rally fired into the crowd, hitting Higenyi, who died instantly.[12]

On 12 December 2002, then Information Minister Basoga Nsadhu announced that radio stations could only be able to broadcast open-air debates commonly known as bimeza after getting outside broadcasting licences. During bimeza members of the public meet in an open place like a restaurant to debate an issue, and their deliberations are broadcast live. The minister said the decision followed months of complaints from various government officials that outside broadcasting was a security threat because, among other things, it put no control on who speaks and what they say. The National Association of Broadcasters threatened court action against the decision, and in the light of strong opposition to the government’s stance from the public – and curiously, even some government officials – the decision was rescinded. But this only came after police had grabbed the broadcasting equipment of some radio stations found doing outside broadcasting. One analyst said the ban on bimeza was an infringement on the rights and freedoms of the press, as well as a clear sign that the government was progressively becoming undemocratic with each passing year.[13]

On 27 June 2003, security forces closed Radio Kyoga Veritas in the eastern town of Soroti, accusing it of running “alarmist” reports on attacks by LRA rebels. They confiscated the station’s news scripts and 25 tapes of testimonies by people affected by the fighting, which had been aired in the previous few days.[14]

Curbing Political Dissent

The post-September 11 era has also emboldened government to crack down on the opposition. Uganda having been one of the countries that openly supported the US war in Iraq, it has itself used the resultant US support to crack down on the opposition under the guise of fighting terrorism, aware that it will not get criticized by the US.[15] There have been cases of many people arrested without being tried in the period stipulated by the constitution. Most of these have been from the Reform Agenda and suspected sympathizers of the LRA. The LRA was included on the list of terrorist organisations by the US shortly after September 11. Additionally human rights agencies point to a number of legislations that have emerged since 2001 which contain limitations to the operation of civil society. Among them are the Political Parties and Organisations Act 2002[16], the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002, and the Non-Governmental Organizations Registration Amendment Bill 2001.[17]

Recent attempts to stop soldiers and former soldiers from discussing military issues is another indication of government’s uneasiness with divergent and critical political views, even as the country prepares to go multiparty next year.[18] Opposition politicians complain that their members are harassed by government functionaries, making it impossible for them to mobilise support beyond the capital.

On 16 September 2002, the Director for Information at the NRM headquarters, Ofwono Opondo, warned radio stations against airing further interviews with Dr Kizza Besigye and threatened them with prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Dr Besigye, the main challenger to President Museveni in the March 2001 elections, fled the country in September 2001 and currently lives in South Africa. He had been a favourite with talk show hosts in Kampala at the time government issued the directive. During one notable interview with the Voice of Africa on August 17, Besigye threatened to resort to “untraditional” methods if his efforts to get fresh elections through constitutional means fail. Opondo said Besigye had declared war on government, and that anyone who helps Besigye “spread his propaganda … comes under suspicion of aiding terrorism, and the anti-terrorism law will apply.”[19]

Torture And Safe Houses

The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) says that “torture is on the increase and, during the January 2001-September 2002 period, more cases than ever were received. While the constitution of the Republic of Uganda prohibits torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, FHRI reports that it has received reports of systematic and widespread use of torture against victims especially in ‘safe house’. It says suspects were physically tortured by severe beatings or psychologically and mentally tortured through interrogation, threats to their lives and the presentation of other persons who had already been tortured. They were also held incommunicado during detention, “which added to their mental anguish and anxiety about their lives”.[20]

The UHRC says the practice of detaining people illegally has not been resolved, and that some police stations have suspects who are guarded by the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence. “These prisoners are not the responsibility of the police and are officially unknown to them. The commission believes that the setting up of ‘safe houses’ within police stations was a result of the pressure exerted on government not to detain people in ungazetted places.”[21]

Civil society organizations (CSOs) say government has developed a sense of impunity and has taken to using harsh methods to contain even situations where such harshness is not required. Operation Wembley and the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU), are cited as examples, where security operatives have used held suspects in ungazetted facilities for long periods of time, tortured them and held them without trial. Many observers say government has been emboldened to use these methods of work with impunity because of the fight against terrorism. “It can now use crude methods to tackle problems without fearing retribution from the international community,” says Mr Apolo Kakaire, a human rights worker with the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative.

The CSOs say Operation Wembley “employed a shoot-on sight policy and generally flouted the principle of the rule of law as suspects were shot at point blank range, detained in military facilities and denied due process of law guaranteed under the Uganda Constitution”. (FHRI). A total of 452 suspects were arrested under the operation. Many of the suspects said they were tortured, beaten at time of arrest by people who did not identity themselves, blindfolded and taken to unknown, ungazetted, illegal places of detention, army barracks or safe houses.[22] Screening of suspects in safe houses does not have a timeframe. The concept of safe houses also goes against Article 23 (2) of the constitution, which states that a person arrested, restricted or detained shall be kept in a place authorised by law.

CSOs also say there have been arbitrary arrests of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from within the IDP camps by Uganda government forces. The reasons for the arrests include suspicion of having links with rebels or political reasons. IDPs who are known to have relatives in rebel ranks are sometimes targeted and harassed or even detained in ungazetted places beyond the statutory period.[23]

 Most victims of illegal detention and torture attribute their treatment to political suppression, reporting that security or military agents accused them of past or current political opposition, insurrection or support for rebel groups, treason or terrorism, or of knowing persons involved in such activities. Others report they were accused of having engaged in or witnessed criminal activity such as murder or robbery, while some link their abuse to personal disputes and vendettas by officials.

Under Ugandan criminal law, only the police are authorized to detain a suspect, who within forty-eight hours must be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court to be charged, or released. The constitution requires military, security and intelligence agencies to promptly turn suspects over to police for detention. Human Rights Watch says since 2001, these agencies have defied laws regulating arrest and detention with no consequences. It says, “Even greater opportunity for abuse is afforded by constitutional provision for pre-trial 360-day detention without bail or probable cause shown for persons suspected of treason and most forms of terrorism, which can include ‘opposing the state’ or possessing a gun.” On ‘safe houses’, HRW says:

"Ugandan security and military agencies routinely take suspects to unacknowledged and ungazetted (not published in the official gazette) places of detention including safe houses and army barracks. Although abolished by Parliament in 1995, safe houses re-emerged in Uganda during the 2001 election campaign, and now operate with no official condemnation or effort to close them down. The 2002 report of a Parliamentary committee investigation into safe houses has not been finalized nor made public by the government. Now an established feature of the Ugandan system of detention, safe houses provide security and military forces with opportunity for unseen torture and interrogation of suspects."[24]

It adds that during incidents of incommunicado detention, interrogation and torture in safe houses, a common pattern of conduct by state and military agencies demonstrates an intention to commit unlawful acts and deliberate efforts to confer impunity on perpetrators. These acts reportedly include hiding the identity of detaining officers, who are often out of uniform, and of the detaining agencies; the absence of a search or arrest warrant; refusal to let the suspect contact family, lawyer, or anyone else; and isolation of the suspect. Others are hiding the identity and location of the detention place by blindfolding the suspect; statements by interrogators that there is no recourse, the suspect is powerless, they are all-powerful; and statements by interrogators that they have the ability to punish the suspect in the future, including prolonging detention.

 Unlawful arrests, beatings and intimidation of opposition supporters and candidates by security agencies preceded both the presidential parliamentary and local council elections in 2001 and 2002, forcing Museveni main challenger in the 2001 elections to flee to exile in South Africa.[25]

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