



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 100386D
27 July 2018

SCARLET KIM
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
62 BRITTON STREET
LONDON EC1M 5UY
GBR

Dear Ms. Kim:

This further responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 13 December 2016 for "access to records relating to the British-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement (now known as the "UKUSA Agreement")." There are no assessable fees for this request.

This is our fourth production in this case. Your request has been processed under the FOIA and four responsive documents are enclosed. The documents total 41 pages and are annotated as NSA FOIA Case 100386 pages 00227 - 00267. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures and 5 documents (17 pages) have been withheld in their entirety.

The withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (b) for foreign government information, (c) for intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, and/or (d) for foreign relations or activities of the U.S., of Section 1.4 and remains classified up to the TOP SECRET level as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security and because of potential harm to our foreign relationships. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by


FOIA Case: 100386D

statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605).

Some of the information has been deleted from the enclosures pursuant to the fifth exemption of the FOIA. This exemption applies to inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency, protecting information that is normally privileged in the civil discovery context, such as information that is part of a predecisional deliberative process.

Please be advised that we continue to work on your request and the review of additional documents responsive to your request, per previous agreement, continues. Documents will be provided on a rolling basis as they are completed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "for Shawn C. Lutz".

JOHN R. CHAPMAN
Chief, FOIA/PA Office
NSA Initial Denial Authority

Encls:
a/s

U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

Background (U)

~~(FOUO)~~ The U.S.-UK Cryptologic relationship is the oldest and most productive of NSA's foreign partnerships. It is based on a formal "UKUSA Agreement," which was signed in 1946, and includes numerous supporting agreements signed over the years with NSA's counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This agreement is the basis for comprehensive cooperation on SIGINT and, to a lesser extent, INFOSEC activities. The U.S.-UK Cryptologic Relationship will continue to be broad and deep well into the 21st Century.

Key Elements of Cryptologic Relations (U)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(TS-CCO)~~ Under the UKUSA Agreement, each side agrees to share all SIGINT-related information; the exchange is unrestricted except for those areas that are specifically excluded (e.g. U.S. ONLY information) at the request of either party.

[Redacted]

~~(TS-CCO)~~ NSA's and GCHQ's intelligence priorities are largely convergent and GCHQ's SIGINT collection and processing capabilities often complement our own. One vibrant example is

[Redacted]

[Redacted] GCHQ is the only SIGINT partner that has bought into the [Redacted]. They have agreed to continue this participation in the future, and are currently making arrangements with their government to do so. GCHQ offers resources for advanced collection, processing, and analysis efforts. Some GCHQ [Redacted]

[Redacted] NSA and GCHQ jointly address collection plans to reduce duplication and maximize coverage through joint sites and cross-tasking, despite site closures.

~~(C)~~ The cryptomathematics exchange with GCHQ is at the heart of our INFOSEC relationship. GCHQ is NSA's only peer in the field of cryptomathematics and virtually all major advances within the field of cryptography have occurred as a result of our mutual sharing [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] As NSA supports U.S. Government efforts towards achieving a secure global information infrastructure, GCHQ stands as our most influential foreign partner in advancing INFOSEC policies in the international arena.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


~~Handle Via COMINT Channels Only~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

U.S.-UK CRYPTOLOGIC ACTIVITIES



JMR-97

- (U) The Joint Management Review is an annual forum for the Directors of NSA and GCHQ and their senior managers to discuss UK/USA cryptologic issues at the strategic level. It is a major symbol of cooperation between the two agencies. NSA and GCHQ trade off hosting the event, which is being held this year in the UK on 18-19 September.



GCHQ CURRENT INITIATIVES

- (U) Readoption of Unions. The new UK Government lifted the 13-year ban on unions at GCHQ in May 1997. NSA was initially concerned about the impact this might have on GCHQ employees assigned to Menwith Hill Station, but no major issues have surfaced. Note: while GCHQ employees are civil servants and therefore can now belong to civil service unions, SIS and BSS employees (plus some law enforcement personnel) are "Crown servants" and are therefore barred from belonging to a union.

~~Handle via BYEMAN COMINT Control Systems Jointly~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

- [Redacted]

- (S-CCO) [Redacted]

OTHER ISSUES:

- (E) [Redacted]

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)
 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) - 18 USC 793
 (b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)
 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



ACTING CHIEF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE

11/13

10 November 1997

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (L)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

NOTE TO THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Key Points in Support of SSCI TDY to GCHQ

Sir,

~~(C)~~ Enclosed are key points to be provided to Senator Shelby in support of his TDY to GCHQ. The topics included were provided to LAO by DDIR following discussions with you. The topics:

- Key Elements of Cryptologic Relationship (Critical Partnership)
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- Personnel and Facility Initiatives

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Input was provided by DP, DS and DO, then consolidated into the enclosed "Critical Partnership" paper.



Encl:
a/s

- cc: DDIR
- EDIR
- DDP
- DDO
- DDS

~~Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL upon~~
~~removal of enclosures~~

~~Derived from: NSA/CSSM 120-3~~
~~Dated 8 September 1991~~
~~Declassify on: Source Marked "OADR"~~
~~Date of source: 8 Sep 01~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS TK/BYEMAN VRK 11 US ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~ NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00230

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC RELATIONSHIP
WITH
THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CRITICAL PARTNERSHIP

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

I. KEY ELEMENTS OF CRYPTOLOGIC RELATIONS (U)

-- ~~(FOUO)~~ The U.S.-UK Cryptologic relationship is the oldest and most productive of NSA's foreign partnerships. It is based on a formal "UKUSA Agreement" which was signed in 1946 and includes numerous supporting agreements signed over the years with NSA's counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This agreement is the basis for comprehensive cooperation on SIGINT and, to a lesser extent, INFOSEC activities. The U.S.-UK cryptologic relationship will continue to be broad and deep well into the 21st Century.

-- ~~(TS-CCO-US-ONLY)~~ Under the UKUSA Agreement, each side agrees to share all SIGINT-related information; the exchange is unrestricted except for those areas that are specifically excluded (e.g. U.S. ONLY information) at the request of either party.

[Redacted]

-- ~~(TS-CK-B-VRK-11)~~ NSA's and GCHQ's intelligence priorities are largely convergent and GCHQ's SIGINT collection and processing capabilities often complement our own; [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] GCHQ has agreed to continue this participation in the future and is currently making arrangements with the government to do so. GCHQ also provides a significant portion of the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

-- (S-CCO) NSA and GCHQ are reassessing major collection facilities and are contemplating the consolidation of [redacted]

-- (C) The cryptomathematics exchange with GCHQ is at the heart of our INFOSEC relationship. GCHQ is highly capable in the field of cryptomathematics and many major advances within the field of cryptography have occurred as a result of our mutual sharing. [redacted]

[redacted] As NSA supports U.S. Government efforts toward achieving a secure global information infrastructure, GCHQ stands as an influential foreign partner in advancing INFOSEC policies in the international arena.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

II. [redacted]

[redacted]

-- (TS) The DCI ensures that the Congressional Intelligence Committees are notified of all significant cooperative agreements for foreign cryptologic support prior to finalizing any such agreements.

-- (FOUO) Senior SSCI staffers were briefed on the [redacted] agreement in early Spring 1997. Followup briefs will be provided near implementation date.

III. [redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

-- (FOUO) [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

-- ~~(FOUO)~~ The senior UK official dealing with encryption is David Fisher from the UK Cabinet Office. Fisher only recently arrived with the new UK Government and is supportive of balancing public safety, national security, and commercial interests.

-- ~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

-- ~~(FOUO)~~ The UK Government and David Fisher are working closely with the US in multilateral discussions with other governments on export controls and compatible approaches to key management infrastructures.

IV. PERSONNEL AND FACILITY INITIATIVES (U)

-- (U) Readoption of Unions. The new UK Government lifted the 13-year ban on unions at GCHQ in May 1997. NSA was initially concerned about the impact this might have on GCHQ employees assigned to Menwith Hill Station but no major issues have surfaced. NOTE: While GCHQ employees are civil servants and, therefore, can now belong to civil service unions, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and British Security Service (BSS) employees (plus some law enforcement personnel) are "Crown Servants" and are, therefore, barred from belonging to a union.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 18 February 1994

W18- -94

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: W18

[redacted] W182, 968-8106s

SUBJECT: Review of US-UK Exchange Agreement ~~(S NF)~~ - INFORMATION MEMORAN-
DUM

TO: W045

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

THRU: W1____, W109____

1. ~~(S NF)~~ The following is provided in response to W045 ACTION
0034-94 MEMORANDUM dated 31 January 1994:

A. NOT CURRENTLY SHARED:

[redacted]

[redacted] Specifics of
the collection efforts are not shared, such as raw data and sources
and methods of the SIGINT data. POC: [redacted] Chief W182,
968-8106s.

B. FUTURE ALTERED/DENIED INFORMATION:

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

W1 is currently reviewing classification guidelines to
determine what information, and under what constraints, could be
shared. This pertains to relaxing the restrictions on sharing of
sensitive collection efforts as discussed in the above item. W1 will
seek to have statements which clarify existing/change guidelines from
at least the W level. POC: [redacted] Chief, W182, 968-8106s.

C. SHOULD BE EXCHANGED:

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

1. W18 would like to see this special SIGINT shared with
the UK to the greatest extent possible [redacted]

[redacted] A fuller exchange
of information would be mutually beneficial to analytic efforts.
POC: [redacted] Chief, W182, 968-8106s.

[redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 1-80)
NSA FORM 100-186 (100-10234)
SERIAL (COMPUTER FACSIMILE)

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 18 USC 793
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

POC: [Redacted] Chief, W182, 968-8106s

3. ~~(S-NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

POC: [Redacted] Chief, W182, 968-8106s.

2. ~~(S-NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

CDR, USN
Chief, W18

Encl:
a/s

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -18 USC 798
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

JG
RF2

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~REL UK~~

DATE: 8 March 1990

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: G C/S SA

SUBJECT: NSA (G Group) - GCHQ (K/H Divisions) DIVISION :
OF EFFORT -- MARCH 1990 ~~(S-GG)~~

TO; DISTRIBUTION

~~(TSC)~~ The enclosed documentation represents the current status of the Divisions of Effort or Informal Working Arrangements in effect between the G Offices and K and H Divisions at GCHQ.




G Chief of Staff
Special Assistant

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DISTRIBUTION

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- G8 ←
- G9



G85
↓

copy for
GGG

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~~REL UK~~

NSA - GCHQ DIVISION OF EFFORT
(G Group - K/H Division)

MARCH 1990

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS EXTREMELY
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
STRICTLY CONTROLLED.~~


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~~REL UK~~

NSA-GCHQ DIVISION OF EFFORT
(G Group - K and H Divisions)

~~(TSC)~~ This document has been prepared to show the current status -- March 1990 -- of cryptologic cooperation between G Group (NSA) and K and H Divisions (GCHQ). Although titled "Division of Effort" (DOE), the DOE concept shared by both organizations does not necessarily reflect a formal arrangement, but rather a series of informal working arrangements agreed to by managers of both agencies since the UKUSA COMINT Agreement was formalized in 1946. The information contained herein has been provided by all the G Offices.



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 19 USC 795
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798
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