[REDACTED]

[Technology Environment 2, Area 1 and Area 2] discussions with MI5

- During the recent IPCO [<u>Technology Environment</u>, or "TE"] follow up inspection on 3-5
 June 2019 we were briefed about the potential error in the [<u>Technology Environment 2</u>,
 or "TE2"] [<u>Area 1</u>] and [<u>Area 2</u>]. A summary of these discussions is recorded below.
- 2. Further to their letter of 15 May MI5 reported on work ongoing to identify any potential errors involving [<u>Area 1</u>] and [<u>Area 2</u>] in [<u>TE2</u>]. MI5 explained that their investigations showed there were no reportable errors in [<u>Area 2</u>] and little or no warranted data held in there. The focus was therefore on [<u>Area 1</u>]. [REDACTED] management of and assurance around certain safeguards is not as MI5 would like it to be.
- This error is not of the same order or type as the [<u>TE</u>]. Work is being led by [<u>a former analyst and user</u>]. [REDACTED]. Access is restricted [REDACTED].
- 4. [A programme] gives analysts access to [warranted data]. [Area 1 allows analysis of data].
- [Work] is well underway. MI5 have now scanned [a high percentage] of [Area 1] and don't plan to scan more at present. This is [because of reasons]. [REDACTED].
 Most [Area 1] users are in [specified departments] but there is some use made by [other departments].
- 6. [References to quantities of data held and amounts scanned]
- 7. [Examples of work within Area 1]
- 8. [References to questions to MI5 in relation to whether data within Area 1 might [REDACTED]. MI5 to give further consideration]
- We observed that MI5 needed a clear policy [REDACTED] (whether in [<u>TE</u>] or [<u>Area 1]/[TE2]</u>) [REDACTED]. IPCO expect to be notified [REDACTED]. MI5 have agreed to notify IPCO [R E D A C T E D]
- MI5 noted that [<u>access</u>] need to be more centrally managed. [REDACTED]. Automated RRD is not routinely applied across [<u>Area 1</u>]. A scan carried out by MI5 identified some historical data [REDACTED].
- 11. [REDACTED]. MI5 admitted that there has historically been a lack of guidance [for users]. [REDACTED].
- 12. A number of mitigations are planned. [REDACTED]. MI5 will [<u>start to use a</u>] a quarantined deletion process. [<u>This will provide</u>] a significantly greater level of assurance.
- 13. [REDACTED]
- 14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. IPCO are content with the approach being taken by MI5 which will provide significantly greater assurance [REDACTED].